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About dogs? Well yes, indeed! Donna Haraway, amply known in feminist theory and technoscience 
studies, famous for her Cyborg Manifesto, published a book which, as the subtitle makes explicit, 
deals with dogs, humans and significant otherness. And not just any book of modest ambition, but 
nothing less than a second manifesto. To find the author of the stories on cyborg-transgressions, 
vampire-frankensteinian monstrosities and transgenic oncomice busy with ‘dog writing’ surprised all, 
amazed many, and disappointed some. Granted, the work is less surprising when one knows that 
human-animal relationships is a thriving topic in US academic landscape nowadays. Still, the 
unexpected work of the person who gathered collective enthusiasm around the figure of the cyborg 
provoked, above all, disorientation. 
What is this astonishment due to? There can be no doubt that, on reading this book, we enter 
Haraway’s universe; recognisable theoretically and methodologically, the tool-box is also known: 
figurations, partial connections, insistence upon the union of flesh-sign or fact-story, and, especially, 
the prominence of the notion of ‘natureculture’, that becomes a major theme in this book. Therefore, 
we can suppose that disorientation relates rather to the novel topic –the uncomfortable dogs. Opinions 
on the book are diverse. Some confess not to understand where the author is heading to, not quite 
knowing what to do with her proposals. Others question that this book contains a new proposal, 
different from previous works: what type of new liminal transgression is led by the dogs which cannot 
be proclaimed by hoisting the cyborg-flag? Others find these dog stories quite petty, and believe that 
only Haraway could afford a book like this. Many wonder whether there is ‘something more’ in these 
pages... 
These reactions have not caught Haraway by surprise. In some conferences this springtime in 
Barcelona1, she herself ironically anticipated the possibility that readers think she’s growing old –not 
finding a better theme that the pet with which she spends winter evenings in the sofa... She claimed to 
                                                     
1 These conferences and seminars were organised by the Musueum of Contemporary Art in Barcelona 
(MACBA), with the collaboration of the Doctorate Programme of Social Psychology of the Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) and the Centre for Women and Literature of the Universitat de 
Barcelona (UB). I also want to thank Helena Torres, who led a working group in these seminars, for 
her comments on a previous version of this paper. 
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be aware that her new proposal was not as ‘shinny’ as her previous ones: no intelligent machines in 
the age of information society, neither biotechnological implants under the skin, not even sophisticated 
research on modest mice tidily confined in their experimental cages. Instead of all this, we find 
ourselves in woods, fields and gardens, inhabiting stories which mix the personal and the public, 
private loves with theoretical passions, and daily, apparently trivial worries with the search for political 
articulations. To be sure, for a particular audience this new work will have lost ‘glamour’: the peculiar 
and fruitful alliance between feminism and technoscience studies characteristic of Haraway’s thought 
attracted some people who were initially more drawn to the bellicose, high-tech, science-fictional 
imagination of the cyborg, rather than to gender issues. Part of them don’t quite know what to do now 
with mates as fleshy and slobbering as dogs.  
However, judging from her naughty smile, Haraway seemed to rejoice at this circumstance, rather than 
regret it... Which should be enough to make us suspect that, under this innocent and banal 
appearance, these pages camouflage a more elaborated argument –plus, as it could not be otherwise, 
a provocation. One more, as usual in her, but this time not so much directed to fight scepticism as to 
challenge adherence. That Haraway talks to a convinced audience, familiar with her thought, can be 
conjectured from how she takes for granted, without many explanations, the concepts developed in 
her previous works2. The manifesto format does not offer an introduction or a conclusion out of which 
to clear a representative summary; since the argument takes shape and distributes throughout the 
whole book, a fast or partial reading will necessarily be insufficient. To appraise the suggestions and 
challenges the book poses, we will need a thorough analysis of her arguments. 
Haraway has accompanied and defended her cyborg proposal before different publics, in different 
places, for years. Enough, we might assume, to arouse a certain feeling of surfeit; we should not 
forget that her slogan ‘cyborgs for earthly survival’ dates from 1985, more than 20 years ago! So it is 
hardly surprising that somebody with her intellectual trajectory feels restless and wants to change 
travelling mates -without disowning the old ones, so profitable in theoretical and political terms. On the 
contrary, to the Harawayan figurative stock, this book adds a new unexpected resource; amazing not 
for its exoticism or sophistication, but for its simple and common character. This new figuration, of 
which the dog is but a concretion, is called by Haraway “companion species”, the main character of 
this new manifesto. Companion species, cum panis, species that share their bread3. 
The term ‘companion animal’ –closer to that of ‘pets’, and that connects us with the technoscientific 
discourse of veterinary, with psychotherapeutical practices and with a blooming industry (p. 12-4)- 
would be a subcategory of ‘companion species’. If we take the example of the dog, we will see that its 
ontological diversity is not exhausted in being pets or companion animals; some also protect or herd 
livestock flocks, earn their bread as professional sportdogs or security guards, become military 
weapons, members of rescue teams or even police drug squads... Whereas pets are reputable 
                                                     
2 For instance, Haraway, D (1991). Simian, Cyborgs, and Women. The Reinvention of Nature. London: 
Free Associations Books. Haraway, D. (1997). Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. 
FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse. London: Routledge. 
3 Haraway makes this etimology explicit in Haraway , D. (2006). ‘A Note of a Sportswriter’s Daughter: 
Companion Species’. For Helene Moglen (ed) Bodies in the making: Trangressions and 
Transformations. Santa Cruz, CA: New Pacific Press. 
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companions, Haraway has something more radical in mind when she suggests this notion, and 
devotes the book to imply, more than define, what she means by it.  
Companion species are those which accompany humans for centuries, crossing their history with ours, 
modelling it. This definition makes space for dogs and bitches, but also –the list is endless- for hens, 
bees, cereals and, for instance, bacteria living in our intestines, without which our survival would not 
be possible. For it is of live and survival we are talking here, and not of mere ‘influences’. We do not 
simply live next to our companion species, but are in a relation of co-constitution with them. Following 
Whitehead and his important notion of prehension (p. 6-7), Haraway will defend that beings do not 
exist as independent entities, but only in relation; ontologically, we continue into each other, without 
clear boundaries limiting/defining entities previous to the relation. There are no subjects, objects, 
types, races, species or genders which are not a product of the relation (p. 7). On the contrary, to talk 
of companion species means to accept that who and what we are is always something relational, 
emergent, process-like, historical, mutable, specific, contingent, finite, complex, impure... In a strict 
sense, then, the major issue of the book is the relation, stating in a radical form that we cannot live 
without the others: “The relation is the smallest unit of analysis, and the relation is about significant 
otherness at every scale” (p. 24).  
This is not a purely symbolic argument, because, as Haraway repeats in all her works, sign and flesh 
are inseparable. Contacts among species are not limited to communication, but also involve a mixture 
of genetic, chemical, virical and protein material, as well as life forms and economical practices, etc. It 
is difficult, for instance, to imagine a human genome which is not marked by molecular material from 
dogs, pigs, fowl and viruses (p. 31). We are constituted and live within each other in all our flesh, in 
relationships which comprise from beautiful solidarity to cruel violence. The trope ‘metaplasm’ (‘a 
change in a word, for example by adding, omitting, inverting, or transposing its letters, syllables, or 
sounds’ (p. 20)) is of use to Haraway to imagine this ontological remodelling product of the relation, to 
imagine how the flesh is remodelled in this co-existence among species. This is a co-existence which 
is constituted by layers of biology and history, exemplifying ‘the implosion of nature and culture’ in 
which live those species ‘bonded in significant otherness’ (p. 16). Indeed, there is an ontological 
exchange between species: companion species co-exist, co-habit and co-constitute each other in 
such an intimate way, that Haraway even speaks of kinship, clarifying that in this heterogeneous 
family the cyborgs would be the ‘junior siblings’ (p. 11). 
To show these metaplasmatic relationships, Haraway works with our canine companions using her 
usual strategy: telling stories. Stories which narrate and constitute facts, and assemble new co-
developmental narrations that admit to this complex and collective mutual constitution among 
companion species, to this ‘embodied cross-species sociality’ (p. 4). Stories that question those 
anthropocentric stories which insist on dividing the course of time into (biologic) evolution for some 
entities on the one hand, and (social) history for others, deepening the big divide between nature and 
culture. Stories of natureculture that acknowledge the intimacies, mixtures and violences which inform 
and limit us. Stories which we must actively inhabit so as to tell the truth about relationship (p. 20), so 
that they can become a collective resource to imagine other relational practices. 
This is why, along one hundred pages, Haraway displays stories about the co-evolution of dogs and 
humans during centuries, showing that ‘history matters in naturecultures’ (p. 3); she evaluates several 
philosophies which dog lovers have defended, discussing different types of relations and intimacies, 
as well as suggesting alternatives to the discourse of animal rights; she takes us to the world of agility 
contests with their bad disguised distinctions of class, age, colour and gender (among owners) and of 
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race and breed (among dogs); she introduces us into the breeding of puppies, its selection, genetic 
control and disciplining; she teaches us how to distinguish good from bad owners, able to invite their 
dog’s trust and respect; she tells us stories of colonisation and conquest in which our four-leg 
companions unexpectedly appear as important actors; she informs us of the north-south colonial trade 
of abandoned dogs awaiting solidarity adoptions; she surprises us narrating the history of dog races 
and their multiple roles in the development of forms of human economy such as herding; and she 
entertains us with ambiguous descriptions of the (human)dog sexual world... 
Donna Haraway leans on several authors’ work. Some contributions are more circumstantial, and 
allow her to defend particular arguments; others, more basic, set up the theoretical framework (p. 6-
10). Among the last, she acknowledges Alfred North Whitehead (prehention), Judith Butler (contingent 
foundation), Helen Verran (emergent ontologies), Charis (Cussins) Thompson (ontologic 
choreographies), Marilyn Strathern (partial connection) and, at another level, Louis Althusser 
(interpellation, p. 17). Rejecting as she usually does disciplinary borders, and looking for resources in 
diverse feminist studies, Haraway has resource to disciplines so various as paleobiology, archaeology, 
ecological developmental biology, population biology, history of science, environmental science, 
behavioural bioanthropology, etc., and puts to use interesting notions such as ‘symbiogenesis’ or 
‘multidirectional genetic flow’.  
Haraway introduces these theoretical notes in a comprehensible way but without going too deep, 
offering succinct summaries of other illuminating researches that leave us wanting for more, and with 
little material to reach our own conclusions. Interesting references must be pursued and explored on 
one’s own. Likewise, she does not enlarge on her points and, sometimes, gives important cues in just 
three lines easy to overlook, which forces us to an attentive reading (this is why here we give, when 
possible, the reference page where to trace arguments). However, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that this is a manifesto, a declaration of political intentions, and not a theoretical book. For the same 
reason, she assumes familiarity with some arguments and debates within feminist theory, through 
which she circulates fast, with ironic references and few words to the wise...  
These are attractive canine stories which inform the multiple ways in which humans and dogs have 
entangled their histories and beings. But Haraway knows that, no matter how interesting they are, 
these narrations will not escape the continuous comparison to her previous work. The move from 
cyborgs to dogs is not easy –or, at least, not straightforward- and may require some explanation. 
Haraway herself seems to feel so, and instead of dodging the issue, accepts the challenge. She 
makes the relation between the two figures explicit from the beginning -actually from the very title-, 
clarifying what cyborgs and companion species have in common. To start with, both of them work 
against the imagination of purity and better protected species boundaries (p. 4). And, importantly, 
these two figures question important dichotomies crossing Western thought: human/non-human, 
organic/technological, carbon/silicon, freedom/structure, history/myth, rich/poor, state/subject, 
diversity/depletion, modernity/postmodernity, nature/culture. Dog stories illustrate this point, just as 
cyborgs had done it earlier: following the relationship human-canine at a developmental, historical, 
biographical level allows this critical work of partial connection.  
Now, whilst this enumeration of similitudes between figurations aims at convincing us that this book is 
not a rupture with her previous work, it is also true that Haraway makes differences clear, in order to 
explain why she lets cyborgs rest and puts dogs to work. This new figuration is necessary, she claims, 
because companion species allow us to tackle different problems in a more effective way. In the  
eighties, Haraway’s cyborg emerged in a world marked by Reagan’s warfare and social politics, by the 
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consequences of the Cold War in a ‘non-optative post-nuclear world’; this figure, which inhabited 
ironically the contradictions of technoculture, enabled a critical perversion of the ‘imperialist fantasies 
of technohumans’ impregnating for years politics and research (p. 4). This context, however, has 
changed. Haraway suggests (p. 5) that nowadays, by the end of the millennium in the age of Bush Jr., 
new worries are added to the old ones -ecological concerns that need new conceptual tools to be deal 
with: debates about the sustainability of our forms of life and their impact on the environment, the 
unequal and unfair energy politics regulating access, distribution and exploitation of resources such as 
oil or water... 
This change also affects our work with figurations. Both cyborgs and companion species should help 
us live critically our naturecultures, but they do it differently. This new figure, which actualises our 
concern for other species both at the level of a single individual and of populations, enables us to 
narrate stories not only of technoscience, but also of biopower and biosociality (p. 5). Moreover, a 
term like ‘species’ introduces into our discourse scientific resonance’s -in particular of developmental 
biology-, and make us alert of the dangers of Aristotelian categorisations; it also reminds us of the 
corporeal nature of the semiotic, and of the hues of dirt to be found in everything counted or traded ‘in 
species’ (p. 15-6), since companion species inhabit impure, complex, finite and historical narratives (p. 
16). With this manifesto, Haraway searches for a new figure that helps shape better politics and 
ontologies for the different forms of live that co-exist in these worlds of ours.  
If the comparison between cyborgs and companion species ended here, perhaps we would not be 
very convinced of the need for this new figure. Just another way of challenging dichotomies? Is the 
dog just a repetition/mutation of the cyborg with ecological undertones –something like a four-leg 
barking furry cyborg? Will we find silicon under the dog skin? If that was the case, this book would be 
nothing else than an intellectual divertimento, and disenchantment would be justified. But if something 
is clear throughout the book is that, apart from being hybrid, Haraway’s is a flesh-and-bone dog, 
whose carnality makes itself present in these hundred pages: it eats from our left-overs, gluttonously 
gulping down the processed liver delicatessen from our ‘click-and-treat’ reward dispenser; we pick up 
its dregs strolling around between pooper-scoopers through Donna’s neighbourhood; we put up with 
its hair and breath in the sofa; its blood spills on the field when wolves attack it while protecting the 
herd; when on heat, we observe it negotiating instincts, hormones and reproductions with breeding 
associations; and, we have even acceded to an ambiguous exchange of fluids and favours on letting 
ourselves be caught by surprise by its deep-throat licks in more than one occasion. 
Oh, my! This is more than some can take. The woman who had forced us to acknowledge our 
ontological intimacy with the non-organic –read computers, machines, prosthesis, chips, tools and any 
kind of artefacts- leaves in our hands, unexpectedly and without warning, a puppy of sharp canines 
that, mischievously, boasts of its new slogan ‘run fast, bite hard’ (p. 5). Differently put, this new 
figuration brings us to the organic –not simply to what exists, but to what lives, to what is alive. The 
same life beating through our planet crosses the pages written by this bio-feminist (because if Donna 
Haraway is a feminist, this book does not let us forget that she is also a biologist). The contrast 
between the living and the dead is so basic, that our difficulties in noticing the novelty of this book are 
quite telling... The consequences of this difference, however, are far-reaching, because, as Haraway 
tirelessly repeats, ‘difference matters’. If this is so, then, what does this one matter? What does the 
companion species confronts us with, that didn’t do the cyborg in its time? 
To state it briefly: to a different type of responsibility towards life. This does not mean that we were not 
obliged towards our cyborg-kin; but this responsibility is different when we enter into relationship with a 
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living being –an argument which Haraway started to develop with the coming on stage of the 
oncomouse. An animal and a person can have a relation in which they matter to each other; this is 
enough to make a difference in their lives, and we cannot ignore it. With this, we approach the 
strongest and the weakest point of the book. The strongest, because here the figure of the companion 
species shows at its best its differential role. Weakest, because this is where she runs the higher risk. 
For, as we will now see, she will claim that accepting our responsibility towards otherness compels us 
to consider seriously issues of respect, trust and love.  
Haraway does not talk of species in general, but focuses, from the beginning, on the relationship dog-
human. And she does not deceive herself; far from egalitarian, it is difficult to think of a relationship in 
which one part is more subordinated to the other in terms of physical dependence, disciplinary devices 
of control, punishment and rewarding. Violence continuously reappears in these dog stories. Then, 
how is it possible to talk of respect, trust and love in a relation constituted to such an extent by power, 
submission and authority? Here her feminist thought comes clearly to light (because if Donna 
Haraway is a biologist, this book does not let us forget that she is also a feminist). With a reasoning 
that might upset some, Haraway decides to abandon the fantasy of thinking love and respect from 
within equality, so as to understand the manifold situations in which these ideal conditions are never 
satisfied. The dog-people relation is of use to see how trust, respect and love can still emerge in 
situations configured by power and violence, but not exhausted by them. This is why Haraway 
suggests that ‘dog writing’ should be considered a contribution not only to technoscience, but also to 
feminist theory: “None of this work is about finding sweet and nice –“feminine”- worlds and 
knowledges free of the ravages and productivities of power. Rather, feminist inquiry is about 
understanding how things work, who is in the action, what might be possible, and how worldly actors 
might somehow be accountable to and love each other less violently” (p. 7). 
In any case, recognising the inequality inherent within dog-human relationships leads us to reflect 
upon what to do with our own power-in-relation, forcing us to accept the impact that our existence has 
in their life. But not because we are all related, and damage to one species can revert negatively upon 
the rest (indeed, we cannot afford to forget that talking of life implies also death; Haraway does not 
insist in vain on the mortal character of the relationship). Rather, we must assume our responsibility in 
what Haraway, adopting Chris Cuomo’s expression, calls ‘the flourishing of otherness’ (p. 54), that is, 
to make what is necessary so that the other unfolds best its own possibilities of being –in the case at 
hand, that the dog be dog, in the best possible doggy conditions. In other words, to deal with life 
charges us with the responsibility to assume as our duty the other’s well-being. Indeed, Haraway is not 
merely talking of life, but poses the ethical need –and this is her political proposal- to strive to turn this 
‘life’ into ‘living well together’: “living well together with the host of species with whom human beings 
emerge on this planet at every scale of time, body, and space” (p. 25). This is an ethics of care –care 
for the other.  
An ethics inspired by the flourishing of otherness starts by acknowledging that the other is not ‘self’. 
This may sound like a platitude, especially when the other is a dog! And still, Haraway denounces two 
tendencies towards the denial of the other’s otherness. The first, the conceptualisation of the other as 
a mere reflection of ourselves and our intentions –our creation. This idea is part of the fantasy of the 
man who realises itself through his creations, hiding the long history of mutual constitution (fantasy 
which Haraway alternatively calls ‘humanist technophiliac narcissism’ (p. 33) or ‘dogsbody version of 
onanism’ (p. 28)). According to this position, the servent dog, created through the skilful domestication 
of the free wolf, would be nothing but an instrument modelled by men and his culture (p. 27-8, 33). 
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The second tendency to deny otherness is to humanise dogs, treating them as fury children (p. 37), 
and subjecting them to an economy of affects which often makes them more vulnerable (especially 
when fickling affects end up in abandonment). 
To desire the other’s wellbeing means not to impose ‘self’ and accept the other’s radical otherness, 
admitting that, in a way, we live in different worlds, and that total comprehension is impossible. 
Nevertheless, this distance must never be an excuse not to try communication; on the contrary, 
‘communication across irreducible difference is what matters’ (p. 49). It is a question of seeking to 
inhabit an inter-subjective world (p. 34), even if it is only approximately and precariously, built from 
within the materiality of the relation: ask in respect for all of time who and what are emerging in 
relationship, is the key. That is so for all true lovers, of whatever species’ (p. 50). This approach to 
otherness, based on ‘negative knowledge’ –knowing that you can only know what the other is not, a 
form of knowledge cultivated in theology (p. 50)- is what Haraway calls love. 
This is a love that emerges from the relation, from the care, and puts us under the obligation of paying 
attention to ‘all the fleshly detail of a mortal relationship’ (p. 34), to these details which contribute to the 
optimal growth of those in relation, and whose neglect can damage both partners. Working for the 
relationship, ‘striving to fulfill the messy conditions of being in love’ (p. 35), includes thoughtful 
attentions. Like, for instance, learning how to play with dogs in such a way that they –and not only the 
owners- have fun (p. 45), or enjoy the satisfaction of common achievement and ‘fulfillment of 
possibility’ when taking up joint activities (p. 52). Or, more importantly, admitting that we often do not 
understand what the dog is, needs, wants or proposes. This ignorance compels us to a ‘permanent 
search for knowledge of the intimate other’ (p. 35), to improve our relationship, recognising at the 
same time the multiple occasions in which we misunderstand each other and make mistakes. Only 
working for a relationship to the advantage of a common wellbeing can the other’s respect and trust 
towards ourselves emerge. In a like manner, such a relationship brings about a reconceptualisation of 
property notions: if a person owns a dog, the latter also owns a person, which foregrounds reciprocity 
and mutual responsibility (p. 53-4). 
On bringing forth a view on love that does not impose ‘self’, but opens up a space for the other to 
develop its otherness fully, Haraway comes close to the Heidegger of the humours, emotions and 
feelings –even though she will not like to hear it. Not only because they share a similar understanding 
of love, but also because both regard ‘self-limitation’ as an ethical practice that love demands. Indeed, 
in some cases the wellbeing of the other involves ‘doing less’ or ‘doing differently’, rather than ‘doing 
more’ -be it a voluntary restriction of one’s action, one’s power or one’s being. Likewise, the key role of 
responsibility and love in our ecological futures brings Haraway closer to French philosopher Michel 
Serres, convinced of the power of love to mobilise the good in the world –the force that can save us. In 
both authors we can find the moderate optimism of those who believe that love can make a difference, 
and that our efforts can help create a better future. Thus, Haraway suggests that daily, ordinary acts 
may have political significance, and our more immediate environment offers plenty of occasions for 
theoretical reflection and ethical praxis. This book is, in her own words, ‘a political act of hope’ (p. 3). 
Readers must not be confused, however. This book is not a return to a well-meaning humanism. The 
book may talk of love, but there is no slight sign of pseudo-refined affectation or of moral prescriptions. 
There are no teachings about unconditional love, which she rather considers a neurotic fantasy at best 
(p. 35) or, at worst, a dangerous discourse for the health of both pets and owners (p. 39). It should 
also be clear –since herein might lie part of the reluctance towards the book- that this work does not 
reintroduce the dichotomies organic-nonorganic or human-nonhuman. After her endeavours to 
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deconstruct them, paying attention to the organic rooted in life may appear as a backward step. But 
deconstructing dichotomies does not mean ignoring differences; her reelaboration of ‘biological 
kinship’ problematises the ‘organism’ (p. 15), and deconstructs, from within the organic, the ontological 
borders between the human and the animal. Her insistence on the emergent relationship stops 
Haraway from falling into essentialism. If we must continuously ask ourselves what agency or entity 
emerges in our relationship with our dog, this always involves us –the agency of the self and of the 
other co-exist and co-constitute each other, and, therefore, differences are always already effects.  
This book has disoriented many people in another sense. Some of its proposals and conclusions are 
so focused on ‘dog land’, that it is difficult to imagine what to do with this book if dogs are not one’s 
direct interest. What’s more, some voices (play with “Haraway + companion species” in Internet, and 
you’ll see that these voices are quite a lot) complain that these reflections may fit dogs perfectly, but 
fail hopelessly with other animals, such as cats (cats are the favourite pets featuring in this criticism, 
even though I must confess that I have not been able to look at mine the same way after reading this 
book...). To be sure, the concrete conclusions about dogs cannot be directly extrapolated to cats –to 
cats or to parakeets or to the multitude of other species which have accompanied ours. If Haraway 
had sought to elaborate global conclusions valid for all companion species, this would be fierce 
criticism.  
Nevertheless, the author warns from the beginning that the book is about dogs –in their diversity, but 
only about dogs, because dogs matter. Haraway states clearly that these beings are not an excuse to 
think something else: ‘dogs are not to think with, but to live with’ (p. 5). Difficult as it may be for some 
to understand, she is interested in dogs. This seeming limitation, I believe, is not so much a fault of the 
book as a wanted virtue; as if Haraway tried to perform practically her message: precisely because 
difference matters, we must think from within the specificity of the relationship, and not from 
categorical abstractions (p. 52). Not in vain is Haraway the scourge of analogy! For her, analogies 
obscure as much as they illuminate –sometimes a symptom of intellectual laziness, always a 
conceptual abuse. Dogs are dogs, cats are cats. Every companion species will need a particular, 
concrete analysis. In any case, it is not in spite of this concretion, but thanks to it, that the spirit of the 
book is generally valid and meaningful as a manifesto, since the question the book seeks to answer is 
“how might an ethics and politics committed to the flourishing of significant otherness be learned from 
taking dog-human relationships seriously?” (p. 3). 
It might not be preposterous to think that the extreme concretion of this figuration is also a kind of 
strategic provocation: an answer to the excesses that the cyborg has suffered in the last years, 
becoming too often a model with which to think everything –too much. This time Haraway seems to 
want to hinder abuses; as she must well have known, the call of the dog does not work so well as a 
manifesto as the cyborg’s did, and this imperfection reveals more clearly the need for specificity and 
the limits of any political aspiration. (Is this self-infliction of performative irony, putting things straight? 
Otherwise, why should repeat title the woman who took pains not to repeat herself, moving from 
cyborgs to dogs, even running the risk of staining her reputation so deservedly achieved?). I can 
almost imagine her smiling mockingly, waiting for the first daring people who, venturing to come to 
terms with their canine nature, proclaim that ‘we are all dogs’ –or, better still, bitches...  
Perhaps I see too much into this book. Maybe, as Haraway herself sarcastically suggested, this work 
is nothing but the fantasy of a woman who loses lustre and falls back into the humano-sentimental 
temptations that she herself so boldly fought. Maybe there is no affectionate rebuke to some cyborg-
excesses, the book appears weak theoretically and her ethic-political proposals before new problems 
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of ecological sustainability sound too moralising. If this is so, I apologise for this recommendation -but 
honestly, I don’t think so. If you still have not done so, read it. This is a pleasant and entertaining book, 
reasonably easy if readers are familiar with the Haraway writing, that coins new expressions, 
condenses adjectives and plays with the syntax for the sake of expression, theoretical accuracy and 
humour. Distancing itself from academic tones, the text offers some lyrical moments, many more 
provocative. (There is certainly something daring in having such a scholar defending the goodness of 
authority and of some behaviourist rewarding systems on behalf of responsibility, freedom and love for 
the other’s possibilities of being (p. 44-7)). 
I won’t try to convince potential readers that this book is as transgressive and suggesting as the 
Cyborg Manifesto –in some respects it is not, in others maybe more. In any case, it deserves to be 
read not against the background of what we expect it to say, but opening ourselves to what it actually 
says, letting it develop its own possibilities of being, without fast formulae or diagonal readings. In 
these hundred pages there is more, quite a lot more, than what the first disorientation may let us think. 
To find this plus, and see how it can make a difference in our lives and works is the pending task that 
this book entrusts us. In any case, whether we like it or not, there is no denying that this work is an act 
of (personal) courage and of (professional) love. Or is it the other way round? Well, with Donna, it 
doesn’t really matter... 
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